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Abstract
The endo/exo-dichotomy in the domain of the material world is analyzed from the stand-
point of old-fashioned Cartesian dualism. The holistic structure of the quantum world
enforces a Platonic view for the universally valid laws governing matter. In contrast to
the structural simplicity of non-operational quantum endophysics, the empirical reality
and experiments belong to quantum exophysics. In algebraic quantum mechanics, the
transition from quantum endophysics to quantum exophysics is mathematically well-
defined. The exophysical richness and variety of the concrete and particular emerges by
imposing a new, contextually selected topology into fundamental endophysics. In the
Cartesian world view, the inverse problem, however, is ill-posed. Though the endophysi-
cal realm can be grasped by human reason, endophysics cannot be set up from sense data
and experiments without recourse to primordial images.
Endo- and exo-description in the material domain
A pertinent distinction referring to internal vs. external viewpoints has been introduced by
Otto Rössler [34], and David Finkelstein [10, 11] under the name «endophysics» and
«exophysics», respectively. In spite of the fact that this endo/exo distinction is of utmost
importance, there is not yet a general agreement about the essence of this new notion. The
reader should therefore be aware that in spite of similar (but not quite identical) definitions,
various authors associate quite different ideas and research programs with this endo/exo–
dichotomy. I will adopt the following characterization1:
Definition 1: A system without accessible external observers is called an
endosystem.
Definition 2: A part of the world which is split into an observed system and
an observing system is called a universe of discourse.
Definition 3: The tools of observation and communication (which may or
may not include human observers) constitute an exosystem.
Definition 4: The system observed is called object.
Definition 5: A metatheoretical distinction generating an object and an
exosystem from an endosystem is called a cut.
1 This formulation is inspired by the discussions we had at the Ringberg Workshop, and is based in an
essential way on a proposal by Dr. Eva Ruhnau. These definitions are more general but compatible with
those used in [26–31] and [33]. Note that Finkelstein’s definition of an endosystem is different [10–12].
Finkelstein writes: “In general, quantum theory asserts that the experimenter and the experimentee are
parts of an inseparable whole system, insists that nevertheless we must partition this system, and does not
tell us how. Call the two parts of this partition the endosystem and exosystem; the endosystem is entity
under study, and the exosystem includes the experimental apparatus, and the relevant external
environment.” [12]. In my terminology, this setting is a universe of discourse, giving an exophysical
description of an open object (Finkelstein’s endosystem) with a Heisenberg cut between the object system
and the measuring tools. That is, only for the exosystem we have the same terminology.
2Inescapably, the study of the endo/exo-dichotomy must be conducted in a metalanguage.
The language in which any endo/exo-theory can ever be formulated is neither part of the
endosystem nor of the exosystem.
I will consider here neither the complementarity of matter and mind nor my possibility to
know my own body from without – as an object among other objects –, and from within –
as a center of my action. Since the endo/exo-dichotomy is of importance already in the
realm of traditional physics, I think it is a reasonable idea at first to restrict the discussion to
purely material systems, a domain where contemporary science provides powerful mathe-
matical tools for a study of this difficult problem.
For a scientific description of the material reality it is inevitable to distinguish between
spirit and matter. Historically, this enforced separation was crucial for the development of
an objectivistic science. It was René Descartes, who first articulated clearly the idea of an
objective external world, separate and radically distinct from the human mind. The
Cartesian duality of mind and body, the mind being immaterial substance (res cogitans,
«thinking substance»), and the body being material substance (res extensa, «extended
substance») was the basis for the development of the modern scientific world view. In
contemporary science, spirit and matter are hopelessly split into two irreconcilable halves.
Of course, there are grave and often discussed problems with the Cartesian dualism of mind
and body. From the point of view of experimental science, the fundamental issue of the
mind–body problem is the question of free will. It is a tacit assumption of all engineering
sciences that nature can be manipulated and that proper initial conditions can be brought
about by interventions of the world external to the object under investigation. The later
monistic doctrines, designed to overcome the Cartesian dualism – e.g. by trying to reduce
mental phenomena to mere products of the brain – did not succeed to solve the problem of
free will in physics, namely that the freedom of action is a constitutive presupposition of all
experimental science.
Since the Cartesian dualism is still the basis of the contemporary physical and engineering
sciences, I will adopt it in spite of its incoherence. I am only too well aware of its
limitations, nevertheless it is a temporarily useful fiction which ensures that  matter does not
contain spiritual elements in an essential way1. The reality here described must therefore be
understood to be only that of a hypothetical purely material world. Moreover, I deliberately
avoid any discussion of two deep unsolved problems of science – the issue of self-reference
and the “phenomenon of nowness” [36]. Starting from this old-fashioned but not easily
avoidable platform, it turns out that it is natural to associate endophysical theories of matter
with ontically interpreted fundamental theories of matter which may be related to true
natural laws . Here, the intended meaning of «truth» is related to some kind of objective
independent reality, as opposed to a context-dependent intersubjective agreement.
Presumably, the endo/exo-relations discussed in this paper are more generally valid but I
have to stress that I discuss here exclusively the endo/exo-dichotomy in the material
domain. That is, I choose a very particular context, and if I use the term «context-
independent» I only mean independent of an additional context.
1 For a discussion of some possibilities to modify this requirement, compare [32].
3Rössler’s endo/exo-distinction vs. quantum endo/exo-physics
In order to avoid misunderstandings, I have to stress that Rössler’s point of departure is
quite different from mine. I accept the holistic nature of quantum physics as an irreducible
trait of nature, while Rössler prefers to enlarge what I call “quantum endophysics” by a
“more explicit” classical description in order to find some kind of an Archimedean point
outside the empirical world from which one could explain what “really” happens in the so-
called quantum world. For this, Rössler introduces a hypothetical external observer (a kind
of superobserver with perfect observing power, like Laplace’s or Maxwell’s external
demons) for whom quantum endophysics is supposed to be accessible from the outside [35].
From this perspective, there may be explicit external features which are known to the
demon but which are not accessible from within ordinary quantum physics. On the other
hand, there are quantum endophysically valid features which are absent in Rössler’s explicit
description [34, 35, 36]. For Rössler the ultimate reality is exophysical (accessible to the
superobserver) while in my view the ultimate reality is endophysical, described by quantum
endophysics which is at the most comprehensible by introspection. In spite of these very
different metaphysical presuppositions, there are no logical contradictions – there is a
peaceful coexistence between these two views.
Rössler adopted the paradigms of classical physics and computer science, and postulated the
existence of an internal observer, that is an observer which can use only procedures and
devices which are realizable from within the endo-system of which he is part. Rössler
compared classical physics “from without” and classical physics “from within” and found
that the associated state concepts were very different. He characterized classical
endophysics with its internal observer as the study of demons which are blocked by a censor
[34]. The aim of such studies is to understand the endoworld as seen by the internal
observer in terms of an exophysical, uncensored superobserver.
In contrast, I choose quantum mechanics as theoretical starting point for the study of
material reality. According to quantum mechanics, the material endoworld is holistic and
not made out of any parts, so that the concept of an “internal observer” makes no sense in
quantum endophysics. In this framework, it would be logically inconsistent to adopt the
view that quantum endophysics deals with problems which arise when “the observers and
their devices are inside the system they observe or act upon”. In a consistent fully quantum-
theoretical discussion we cannot neglect the existence of Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen
correlations between any two material parts of the world. We can speak of an individual
subject and an individual object only if these two systems are disentangled, that is, if we
assume or if we can prove that they are not Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen-correlated. In this
sense, quantum endophysics is conceptually different from classical endophysics, so that an
elucidation of quantum endophysics proceeds in a quite different spirit. We may call the
observer-free quantum endophysics the study of the Platonic heaven, the realm of non-
spatial, non-mental, timeless but nevertheless real entities.
A hard-boiled positivist may have difficulties to appreciate such a quantum endophysics
since it refers by definition to some kind of a Platonic universe, and not to empirical facts.
The aim of the study of quantum endophysics is not the hope to find the “true and real”
4values for all endophysical observables1 (these do not exist!) but to formulate universally
valid natural laws endophysically in view of theoretical derivations of operationally mean-
ingful exophysical descriptions. As in the Boscovich–Rössler universe, in quantum theory a
human observer can never observe the world as it is governed by the universal natural laws.
Every operationally meaningful description we can give is observer-dependent or
contextual. That is, for a hard-boiled positivist, universally valid natural laws do not exist.
The introduction of a Platonic quantum endophysics is motivated by the necessity to find a
place for universal natural laws.
Why the standard reduction model does not work
We speak of an epistemological reduction when one scientific theory is shown to be a
deductive consequence of another one. The replacement of one theory by another may
imply a methodological reduction but this is not the central issue. The main problem of
reductionism (say in the sense of Kemeny and Oppenheim, or Ernest Nagel) is the question
whether some or all phenomenological scientific theories can be deduced from a
fundamental physical theory. While philosophers of science admit that “in practice it seems
that very few examples of reduction exhibit a straightforward deductive pattern” [1], they
fail to recognize that there is no single nontrivial example of a rigorous deduction of a
phenomenological law from truly first principles 2. The reason is that such a deduction is
logically impossible without the introduction of a context. Scientists have studied many
intertheoretical relations in a mathematically rigorous way and found conclusively that none
of these correspond to any of the reduction relations defended by the philosophers.
Phenomenological theories may be in a state of peaceful co-existence with first principles
considered as fundamental, but they cannot be deduced from them without introducing
crucial new structural elements.
Basic theories claim universal validity, while all phenomenological theories are context-
dependent, they cannot be deduced from universally valid first principles without taking
into consideration the abstractions evoked by the pattern recognition devices necessary for
the observation of phenomena. Such context-dependent abstractions do not falsify our
description of the material reality but they create the exophysical patterns by means of
which we interpret the world. Of course, these exophysical patterns depend both on the
intrinsic properties of the endoworld and on the abstractions associated with the pattern
recognition procedure.
A mathematically formulated deduction of a higher-level description from a fundamental
theory is conceivable only if in the basic theory a new contextual topology is introduced.
This new topology is never given a priori but depends in a crucial way on the abstractions
1 Warning: Quantum mechanics is muddled with virtually the worst possible terminology. In the jargon of
modern quantum mechanics, «observable» is a (most unfortunate) technical term with no fixed a priori
meaning. In particular, the term «endophysical observable» has absolutely nothing to do with the
exophysical concept of an “observation”. In quantum endophysics, observables represent potential
properties. In quantum exophysics statistical measurements are related with positive operator-valued
measures (and not with observables).
2 The standard of rigor of the discussion about reductionism adopted by most philosophers of science is
unacceptable. The level we have to require for any serious study of theory reduction has been set by
Friedrichs [14] in his analysis of the relation between geometrical optics and electrodynamics.
5made by the cognitive apparatus or the pattern recognition devices used by the
experimentalist. The closure of such a higher-level description in the contextual topology
generates new context-dependent entities which are not already present in the fundamental
description. The associated breakings of fundamental symmetries may be describable as
singular asymptotic expansions which are not uniformly convergent in the intrinsic topology
but only in an appropriate, non-fundamental, contextually selected topology. In this
mathematically precise sense, one can speak of the emergence of novelty in descriptions on
a  higher level. The task of higher-level description is not to approximate the fundamental
theory but to represent this contextual novelty. Yet, the universally valid first principles are
never sufficient for deducing higher-level theories since, of course, the context is never
given by first principles. The laws of nature do not determine uniquely the world we
encounter, the specification of the context is at least of equal importance as the first
principles.
Early modern science owes its success in part to an adherence to atomism, reductionism and
a naive common-sense realism, i.e. the belief that ultimately everything comes down to the
mechanics of very concrete atoms1. It started with the trustful presupposition that we can
know things as they really are through observations and experiments, and naively related
first principles with directly observable phenomena. In the course of time, however,
theoretical physics developed more and more towards universal, context-independent
theoretical formulations. This development cannot be explained positivistically from the
mere desideratum to achieve intersubjective agreement about empirical facts. While Newton
did not doubt the concrete existence of corpuscular entities in analogy with gross bodies2,
the research program of atomism finally led to the formulation of quantum mechanics in
terms of abstract elementary entities which are nothing like Newton’s corpuscles but bear a
striking resemblance to primordial archetypal structures. Nowadays, a rash identification of
the concrete with primordial symbolic structures is untenable.
Modern theories of matter are most certainly not what famous philosophers of science like
Joseph Sneed claim, namely that “scientific theories are sets of statements; some of which
are empirically true or false” [37]. In modern physics is that what one may consider as
“ultimate reality” quite universal but very abstract, and by no means directly related to the
richness of the concrete.  Claiming real existence for abstract ultimate entities necessarily
has a Platonic flavor and is, of its nature, not provable. On the other hand, all so-called
“facts” and empirical truths are heavily context-dependent, hence not in a straightforward
manner related to universal physical laws which rule modern fundamental theories.
Faced with this situation, we are forced to distinguish between intrinsic and operational
descriptions. An intrinsic description characterizes the properties and the states of a physical
system without explicit reference to other physical systems. By contrast, an operational
description makes explicit reference to other physical systems than the one singled out for
1 As late as 1872 Emil du Bois-Reymond said: “Denken wir uns alle Veränderungen in der Körperwelt in
Bewegungen von Atomen aufgelöst, die durch deren konstante Zentralkräfte bewirkt werden, so wäre das
Weltall naturwissenschaftlich erkannt.” [4].
2 Recall Newton’s ideas about atoms: “God in the Beginning form'd Matter in solid, massy, hard, impene-
trable moveable Particles …; no ordinary Power being able  to divide what God Himself made one in the
first Creation” ([22], Query 31).
6special study. It typically characterizes the properties of the object system in terms of test
procedures which must be described in terms of external systems. The interrelations
between intrinsic and operational descriptions are far more complex than presumed by the
reductionists. For a deeper study, we are forced to introduce a crucial distinction, that
between endo- and exo-theories. The research program of the reductionist has to be replaced
by a study of the interface between endo- and exophysics.
Endophysics – and not exophysics – is the domain where one can hope to find universally
valid first principles. My main thesis is that the endo/exo perspective is the proper tool to
discuss both intrinsic and extrinsic descriptions in a common unifying framework, and to
avoid the widespread confusion between ontic and epistemic notions. The idea that natural
laws may be associated to ontological truths is nowadays not a popular view among
scientists  but it can hardly be avoided if one would like to keep realism and avoid naive
realism. I will illustrate this thesis by the modern quantum theory of matter.
On the ignorance of the endo/exo-dichotomy
One may argue that the endo/exo distinction is unimportant since, after all, classical physics
has been interpreted without too much difficulties without such a distinction. Historically,
the measurement problem in classical physics has played no important role. Nevertheless, a
thoughtful discussion of the relationship of first principles and phenomena shows that even
in classical physics one cannot avoid to investigate the interface between endo- and exo-
descriptions.
The crucial point is that the referents and the aims of endophysics and of exophysics are
different. Endophysics refers to a subject-independent reality while exophysics refers to the
empirical reality. Endophysics aims at metaphysical universal laws, while exophysics aims
to give us empirically adequate descriptions. Endo-entities belong to the subject-
independent reality, they may be related to hypothetical “things-in-themselves” or to
Platonian ideas. They are hidden from us and certainly not directly observable. Observations
and experiments do not reveal us directly this endo-reality. In contradistinction, exophysics
refers also to tangible objects we can directly see, feel, and touch. The relations between
independent reality and appearance, that is, the interface between endo- and exotheoretical
descriptions is, strange to say, one of the most neglected topics of scientific discourse.
One reason for this disregard is the confusion of abstraction and approximation. Classical
physics deals with «ideal entities» like mass points. Mass points do not exist in the real
world, but in celestial mechanics they are considered as approximations, say describing the
motion of real planets. On the other hand, Newtonian mass points have also an exact
meaning als elementary systems in the sense of indecomposable representations of the
Galilei group. Elementary systems are abstractions motivated by experiments but it would
be a category mistake to identify the ideal object «mass point» (in the sense of an
elementary system) with concrete mass particles (in the sense of an approximation). Ideal
objects (like elementary systems, which may even lack individuality) belong to the
endoworld while tangible things are the objects of an exophysical description.
7If one disregards the essential difference between the endo- and the exo-theoretical view,
one can hardly avoid Bas van Fraassen’s [13] conclusion that we should discard the idea
that there are “laws of nature”, or Nancy Cartwright’s [5] verdict that the fundamental
laws of physics “do not get the facts right”, “do not state the truth” but that
“phenomenological laws are indeed true of the objects in reality”. These consequences are
indeed inescapable if one assumes that the referents of fundamental theories are the
phenomena in the exo-domain. However, such a view is based on a philosophical
conception of the role and the aim of theoretical physics which few creative theoreticians
will stand up for. Fundamental scientific theories do not move onward solely by
generalizations of phenomenological laws and the rational use of rational principles. In the
wording of Marcus Fierz: “Theoretical physics surely appears quite rational, but it rises
from irrational depths.” [9]. The structure of endophysics cannot be dealt with without
considering the symbolic construction of scientific theories1.
Theoretical scientists have a deep-rooted bias favoring symmetry. Lie groups and gauge
invariance are now recognized as basic principles, but there is no logical way from
experience to such symbolic forms. Endophysical first principles depend to an astonishing
degree on mathematical constructs like symmetries which in turn depend on primordial
intuition2 and symbolic representations3. It is impossible to comprehend the structure of
endophysics if one dismisses the inherent human capacity for concept formation. It is a
necessary element in the creation of fundamental theories so that these always contain
archetypal elements which do not come in directly via physical experimentation, and which
reason fails to grasp. The process of forming physical theories has been described by
Wolfgang Pauli as follows: “Ich hoffe, daß niemand mehr der Meinung ist, daß Theorien
durch zwingende logische Schlüsse aus Protokollbüchern abgeleitet werden, eine Ansicht,
die in meinen Studententagen noch sehr in Mode war. Theorien kommen zustande durch ein
vom empirischen Material inspiriertes Verstehen, welches am besten im Anschluß an Plato
als zur Deckung kommen von inneren Bildern mit äußeren Objekten und ihrem Verhalten
zu deuten ist. Die Möglichkeit des Verstehens zeigt aufs neue das Vorhandensein
regulierender typischer Anordnungen, denen sowohl das Innen wie das Außen des
Menschen unterworfen sind.” [25].
Cartwright correctly states that “phenomenological laws describe what happens”, but that
the fundamental laws do not state the facts. This is trivially true since the referent of
endophysical first principles is not the exoworld of empirical facts. Endo-concepts are
1 In direct contrast to a sign, a symbol never stands for a known thing. We use the concept of a symbol in
the sense of Carl Gustav Jung, as “an expression for something that cannot be characterized in any other
or better way”. ([18], #816). “Since every scientific theory contains a hypothesis, and is therefore an
anticipatory description of something still essentially unknown, it is a symbol.” ([18], #817). Compare
also the the essays by Hermann Weyl [42, 43, 44].
2 Here, intuition is understood in the sense of a perception of primordial images via the unconscious. In
spite of Brouwer’s aversion from science, his “Primordial Intuition” is related to the intuition which is at
work in theoretical science. For a discussion of Brouwer’s Primordial Intuition, compare [38].
3 In a letter to Hermann Levin Goldschmidt  Wolfgang Pauli writes: „Das Symbol ist stets ein abstraktes
Zeichen, sei es nun quantitative oder qualitative, sei es mathematisch-gedanklich oder emotional bewertet
(„gefühls-geladen“). Nur ein Teil des Symbols ist durch bewusste Ideen ausdrückbar, ein anderer Teil
wirkt auf den „unbewussten“ oder „vorbewussten“ Zustand des Menschen. So geht es auch mit den
mathematischen Zeichen, denn nur derjenige ist für Mathematik begabt, für den diese Zeichen (im
erläuterten Sinne) Symbolkraft besitzen. Das Symbol ist stets ein Gegensätze vereinigendes tertium, das
die Logik allein allerdings nicht „geben“ kann.“ [23].
8linked to the universality and simplicity of primordial patterns, while exo-concepts relate to
the variety and richness of the concrete and particular. Accordingly, endo-concepts are
categorically different from exo-concepts. The crux in this discourse is that in the historical
development of physics endo- and exo-descriptions have not been separated in a proper
way.
The space-time concepts are particularly difficult since they play an important – but
essentially different – role in endo- and in exophysics. Because of this double role we have
to be careful not to confuse them. In contrast to the reversible Newtonian time which
manifests no asymmetry between past and future,  Norbert Wiener [45] spoke of Bergsonian
time when he wanted to emphasize the novelty-creating aspect of time. Newtonian time
refers to endo-theories, Bergsonian time to exo-theories. Freedom of action, according to
Henri Bergson, is fully certified by direct experience, hence something associated to
Bergsonian (in contrast to Newtonian) time [2]. In this sense, the freedom of the
experimenter to choose initial conditions is an exophysical quality which is not necessarily
in contradiction with a presupposed endophysical determinism.
Ontic and epistemic interpretations
An interpretation refers to a logically consistent theoretical formalism which is in a mathe-
matically rigorous way codified. I adopt the following characterization:
Definition: An interpretation of a mathematically formulated physical
theory is characterized by a set of normative regulative
principles which can neither be deduced nor be refused on
the basis of the mathematical codification.
We distinguish between epistemic and ontic interpretations. Epistemic interpretations refer
to our knowledge of the properties or modes of reactions of systems, while ontic
interpretations refer to the properties of the object system itself, regardless of whether we
know them or not, and independently of any perturbations by observing acts. The
operationalistic view requires an epistemic interpretation and usually works with a statistical
ensemble description.
Both in endophysics and in exophysics, I will adopt a realistic view. In endophysics, the
basic tenet requires that there is something that does not derive its existence from the
existence of human mind. This “something” has been called independent reality by Bernard
d’Espagnat [7] . Quite differently, the exophysical reality refers to observable
phenomena, and corresponds to d’Espagnat’s empirical reality. Statements about the
empirical reality contain a non-removable reference to the community of possible observers.
Such statements are at the most intersubjectively valid, or, in d’Espagnat’s
terminology, weakly objective. In contradistinction, hypothetical statements about the
endophysical reality are strongly objective, they refer to the properties the endophysical
reality supposedly has. Folklore to the contrary notwithstanding, quantum laws are strongly
objective provided they are formulated in the framework of quantum endophysics.
9From an endophysical viewpoint, the Platonic ideas are standards of truth. That is, we hold
that the assertions of an endophysical theory are true or false, and what make them true or
false is not our mind or our experiments. Of course, we do not know, but we may hope that
quantum endophysics gives a true description of the basic structure of the material world. In
order that such an endotheory can be helpful for experimental science, it has to be
supplemented by a relevant exophysical context which at best is appropriate. Certainly
contextual exophysical propositions do not deserve the attribute «true». In modern
experimental science, the generally accepted exophysical correctness criterion is Vico’s
verum factum principle: we can know for certain only that which we ourselves have made1.
A short characterization of endo- and exo-descriptions
Endo-description Exo-description
Regulative principle
Universality:
Platonian simplicity
of the abstract  and general
Contextuality:
Aristotelian richness and variety
of the concrete and particular
Laws Fundamental first principles Phenomenological
Referent of the theories
Hypothetical
“things-in-themselves”,
Platonian ideas
Concrete objects
directly perceptible phenomena,
empirically accessible phenomena
Truth criterion Platonic Verum factum principle
Natural interpretation Ontic Epistemic
Logic Sharp logic(Boolean or orthomodular)
Fuzzy logic
(Boolean or orthomodular)
Descriptions
Descriptions are within
certain limits universal,
but not operational
Descriptions are operational
but in a crucial sense
context-dependent
Parameters Very fewuniversal constants
Many context-dependent
empirical constants
Time
Newtonian time,
no asymmetry between
past and future
“Bergsonian” time,
asymmetry between
past and future
Events No facts Emergence of facts
1 “Verum et factum convertuntur” (“the true and the made are convertible”), Giovanni Battista Vico (1668–
1744) in: De antiquissima Italorum sapientia, 1710. Compare also [41], Ziff. 331, and sects. 1.2 and 2.3
of the introduction by V. Hösle.
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On the relations between quantum endophysics and quantum exophysics
Science has always been looking for unity in diversity. Unifying endotheoretical first
principles have to be context-independent. The Aristotelian richness and variety of the
concrete and particular has no place in endophysics. At all times, the guideline for the
formulation of first principles has been simplex sigillum veri – radical structural simplicity
in the sense of simple primordial ideas. An exemplary primordial idea is atomism.
Democritos suggested that in the attempt to divide matter again and again, one finally
should end up with indivisible, unchangeable entities, called atoms. The mechanistic
program of atomism aimed at the explanation of all qualities of matter in terms of the
positions and motions of these atoms. In the seventeenth century atomism has already been
established as a viable natural philosophy and was one of the driving forces of the
development of physics. Ironically, according to our present understanding, we have to
admit that all atomic hypotheses were wrong. The fundamental structures turned out to be
much more abstract than the atomists hoped for. In fundamental quantum mechanics,
context-independent material atoms or “elementary particles” do not exist. The modern
view is much nearer to Plato’s ideas, according to which the attempt to divide matter again
and again results in mathematical forms. Theoretical physics progressed from the simple to
the yet simpler, ending with the pure simplicity of fundamental symmetries. The associated
elementary entities are defined as indecomposable representations of the symmetry group,
yet matter is not made out of elementary entities (like bare electrons or bare fields).
All fundamental universally valid first principles we know are deterministic and refer to
strictly closed systems1. Since strictly closed systems cannot be observed from outside,
universal first principles are endophysical laws. Strictly speaking, there is nothing outside a
quantum endosystem. The endophysical description is a view without perspective, it is
God's panorama, a “view from nowhere”. Endophysical first principles are inspired by the
shadows on the wall of Plato’s cave, but they cannot be deduced from experimental facts.
The leading idea is simply that a fundamental law must not depend on contexts: it refers to
an endoworld having a maximal unbroken symmetry. The associated endophysical
elementary systems are precisely defined, and they are simple in the sense that they have –
unlike Newtonian atoms – only an exhaustible set of attributes . However, endophysical
elementary quantum systems are not localized and lack individuality. Since in endophysics,
the concept of an environment makes no sense, endophysical elementary systems have to be
considerd as “naked” – no environmental effects are included.
In contradistinction to quantum endophysics, quantum exophysics is associated with
experimental physics. Every experiment and every operationally meaningful description
requires a division of the endo-world into an object system and an observing system. Yet,
the endoworld does not present itself already divided – we have to divide it. Therefore
endophysical first principles are not sufficient for an operational description of an
exosystem, we have to add the particular context which characterizes the cut between the
material object and the material observing tools.
1 A physical system is said to be closed if all the variables that can influence the behavior of the system
have been taken into account in the initial specification. Any other system is called open.
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In quantum theories, the concepts of «object» and «observing tools» are  conceptually
highly nontrivial since a material system qualifies as an observing tool only if it is not
entangled with the object by Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen correlations. An exophysical object
is characterized by a cut which separates it from its environment, it owes its existence to the
interaction with the environment. In particular, the separability and localizability of the exo-
objects of our everyday experience are generated by interactions of the separated object
with the environment. The cut between object and environment can not be chosen
arbitrarily, nevertheless it is not prescribed by endophysical first principles. Exophysical
objects are clearly abstraction-dependent, hence contextual, but they are not free inventions.
They have no endophysical existence, but they represent patterns of the endo-reality.
Exophysical objects are to some degree fuzzy, and carry with them a variety of
connotations, so a precise description in terms of a sharp logic is not feasible – they are far
too vague for that. The proper mathematical tool for their description is a fuzzy logic, in
quantum exophysics realized by probability operator measures (i.e. positive operator-valued
measures).
Another crucial difference between quantum endophysics and quantum exophysics is that
there are no universally valid principles for exotheoretical descriptions of matter, but only
contextual phenomenological laws. It is typical for such laws (like the equation for heat
conduction, thermodynamical laws, information theory) that they contain new concepts
(like temperature, entropy, information, memory, purpose, meaning), and many empirical
parameters (like diffusion coefficients, Reynolds numbers, virial coefficients), which are
unknown in fundamental endophysical theories.
An endophysical universe is Platonic, it has no manifest appearance, it cannot be observed
directly by our five senses. In contrast to this unbroken wholeness, the world we experience
is full of broken symmetries. The fundamental symmetries of the endo-world are not
manifest in our everyday experience. It is necessary to break fundamental symmetries, as
clearly recognized by Pierre Curie [6]: “C’est la dissymétrie qui crée le phénomène”.
Observable patterns of the world do not exist in the Platonic universe, they come into being
through symmetry breakings. All symmetry breakings are contextual, all apparent violations
of basic natural laws come from contextual symmetry breakings.
The relation between quantum endophysics and quantum exophysics corresponds to that of
Plato’s transcendent universals and the shadows on the wall of Plato’s cave. The existence
of such universals can only be inferred intuitively and expressed mathematically. The
problem of linking endophysical ideas to exophysical empirical concepts is the task of a
theory of measurement. The notorious measurement problem in quantum mechanics is an
example of such an interface problem: the derivation of a statistical interpretation of
quantum exophysics from ontologically phrased quantum endophysics1.
1 Most certainly, the historically so important but nevertheless ill-posed so-called “correspondence princi-
ple” will be of no use for this task.
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Galilei-relativistic quantum mechanics
For the further discussion, it is neither expedient nor feasible to start with the most
fundamental first principles of physics. Yet even so, in the Galilei-relativistic domain,
quantum mechanics is a highly successful theory of matter. In its most basic formulation, it
fulfills most criteria of an endophysical theory. It refers to Platonic elementary systems (like
bare electrons and photons) which can be characterized by an exhaustible set of attributes
but which are not directly observable1. The dynamics of these quantities is formulated in
terms of Newtonian time, which does not distinguish between past and future. Moreover,
these endophysical dynamical laws are Hamiltonian, that is they are valid only for strictly
closed systems. If we adopt the Cartesian cut, all first principles of this quantum
endomechanics are strictly subject-independent, they refer to hypothetical “things-in-
themselves”. Therefore, in an appropriate codification2, Galilei-relativistic quantum
mechanics may serve as a mathematical model for an endophysical theory of matter.
It is astonishing but correct that these metaphysical mathematical constructs are of prime
importance for experimental science and engineering. Admittedly, the corresponding
endo/exo-interface – the quantum mechanical measurement process – is the weakest feature
of quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, we have pragmatic working rules (like the so-called
projection postulate) which fix the gap for the time being. The only reasonable explanation
why the first principles of quantum mechanics are so enormously successful in engineering
science is that the endophysical laws are to some degree a true description of objective
structural aspects of the material reality. If this is so, they “do state the truth”.
Our contemporary texts on quantum mechanics fail to analyze the exo/endo-perspective and
they mix up endo- and exo-theoretical notions. One of the reasons of this misconception is
due to the fact that in traditional quantum mechanics – in contrast to classical mechanics –
the ontic endophysical and the epistemic exophysical description can be formulated in the
very same mathematical framework: the Hilbert-space formalism of quantum mechanics. If
the underlying phase space is locally compact, this procedure is mathematically correct but
conceptually misleading. A closer analysis shows that for Hamiltonian theories (including
classical mechanics and quantum mechanics over an arbitrary phase space) in general the
mathematical formalism for ontic endophysics is different from the formalism for statistical
exophysics.
Quantum endophysics describes material reality in terms of a non-fuzzy orthomodular, non-
Boolean logical structure. Every exophysical description of this non-Boolean quantum
reality involves a projection onto a Boolean context. Non-Boolean scientific theories (like
quantum mechanics) intrinsically lead to the logical concept of complementarity. Context-
independent Boolean descriptions of a non-Boolean world do not exist.
1 For example, in the framework of Galilean quantum endophysics, a bare electron is uniquely character-
ized by its mass, spin, electric charge and magnetic dipole moment. Such a bare electron, however, is not
observable because it is necessarily coupled with its own electromagnetic radiation field which does not
belong to the attributes of the bare electron. For instance, the experimentally measurable mass of the
(dressed) electron is not the mass of the bare electron.
2 Of course, pragmatic working rules like the projection postulate, or phenomenological concepts like
entropy are not part of endophysics.
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Example: Hilbert-space endophysics is different from Hilbert-space exophysics
Often it is not appreciated that even the mathematical formalism for traditional
statistical quantum exophysics is different from the formalism for individual
quantum endophysics. Traditional quantum mechanics deals with locally
compact phase spaces (i.e. systems with only finitely many degrees of freedom),
so that in this special case the uniqueness theorem by Stone and von Neumann
[20, 39] implies that both quantum endophysics and quantum exophysics can be
formulated on the very same Hilbert space H  as the basic mathematical
substrate. This is a very unusual situation which easily leads to conceptual
confusions.
In the traditional exophysical formulation, the algebra of bounded contextual
observables is the W*-algebra   B H( ) of all bounded operators acting on the
Hilbert space H , while the statistical states are described by density operators,
i.e. by elements of the Banach space   B H1( ) of trace-class operators on H ,
whereby   B H1( ) is the predual of  B H( ),  { ( )} ( )B H B H1 ∗ = . In the endo-
physical formulation, the algebra of intrinsic observables is much smaller, it is
given by the C*-algebra  B H∞( ) of compact operators acting on H , while the
individual endophysical states can be represented by the positive extremal
elements of the dual { ( )}B H∞ ∗ of the C*-algebra B H∞( ). It turns out that
{ ( )} ( )B H B H∞ ∗ = 1 . This is a singular situation, implying that the state space
of individual quantum mechanics is the same Banach space as the state space of
statistical quantum mechanics, a fact which is responsible for many confusions in
the literature. Many of the conceptual difficulties and alleged paradoxes of
traditional quantum mechanics are due to the failure to distinguish properly
between endophysical and exophysical formulations.
In traditional quantum mechanics, the C*-algebra B H∞( ) of intrinsic
observables determines uniquely the W*-algebra   B H( ) of the statistical
description,   { ( )} ( )B H B H∞ ∗∗ = . This mathematical fact – essentially the
Stone–von Neumann uniqueness theorem – suggests that traditional quantum
mechanics is not a suitable candidate for the description of the universal endo-
physical first principles. In this framework, there would be no symmetry
breakings, and all the richness and variety of the exophysical empirical reality
could not exist.
Ontic quantum endophysics and epistemic quantum exophysics
The appropriate interpretation of endophysics is an individual interpretation, preferably an
ontic one. Since there is no concept of an observer, an epistemic interpretation makes no
sense. In the algebraic codification of physical theories, an individual interpretation requires
the concept of an individual state which in turn requires as a mathematical substrate a
continuous structure like a manifold or a separable C*-algebra. An individual state is called
an ontic state if it realizes the intrinsic concept of Platonic truth. Note that an ontic state
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does not provide us with any operational criterion for determining it. Experimentally
inaccessible ontic states are not meaningless but play a particularly interesting role in
classical mechanics, they lead to the phenomenon of the so-called deterministic chaos, that
is, dynamical processes whose endophysical description is bidirectionally deterministic but
all whose exophysical operational descriptions are nondeterministic.
In order that exophysics has a direct relation to experiments, its interpretation has to be
operational and to refer to our knowledge. In the algebraic codification of physical theories,
an epistemic interpretation requires the concept of probability measure, or more generally,
of statistical states. The appropriate mathematical structures are measurable spaces, like
Lebesgue spaces, or W*-algebras with a separable predual.
Example: Ontic states in classical mechanics of individual mass points
Consider a classical dynamical system with a symplectic manifold W as phase
space. For every point   w W∈ , the equations of motion of the dynamical system
specify a trajectory   t t t¢ w( ) , ≥ 0. The quantity   w( )t  is called the individual
state at time t. This individual state  w( )t  describes in an exhaustive manner all
the properties the individual dynamical system has at time t, and can therefore be
interpreted as an ontic state, referring to intrinsic properties an object has at
time t.
Example: Epistemic statistical states in classical mechanics
Consider a classical dynamical system with phase space W. For a statistical
description one introduces a measurable space ( , )W B , where   B  is the most
refined Boolean algebra of experimentally decideable events. A countably
additive probability measure m on the measurable space ( , )W B  is called a
statistical state of the dynamical system with the phase space W. The probability
measure m refers to our knowledge, usually to the results of statistical experi-
ments. As a rule, we cannot know the individual state w but only that it is more
likely to be in some Borel sets of W than in others. That is,   m( )B  is interpreted as
the probability that the individual state w is in the Borel set   B ∈B . In the alge-
braic formulation, the statistical states are represented by probability densities,
that is of positive and normalized elements of the Banach space   L1( )W . The dual
of this Banach space is the W*-algebra L∞( )W  of bounded Borel-measurable
functions on W, and is called the algebra of bounded observables.
It is generally accepted that quantum mechanical predictions are intrinsically of statistical
character. This circumstance, however, neither implies that an individual interpretation of
quantum mechanics is impossible, nor that a purely statistical interpretation is unprob-
lematic. In quantum theories, the statistical state space is not a simplex, so that a statistical
quantum state does not specify an ensemble in the sense of a mixture of individual systems
in pure states. Moreover, the statistical interpretation presupposes the existence of classical
domains, the existence of irreversible events, and a preferred direction of time such that the
concept of prediction makes sense. These are clearly contextual requirements which should
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not be included in the collection of first principles but they have to be used as regulative
principles in a derivation of a statistical description from the basic individual interpretation.
Just as in classical point mechanics, the individual description of an arbitrary quantum
system can be given in terms of an appropriate separable C*-algebra A  of intrinsic
observables, where the individual states are represented by the extremal positive elements
of the dual A * of A . The statistical description of a quantum system has to be given in
terms of an appropriate W*-algebra M  of contextual observables where it is assumed that
M  has a separable predual   M∗ ,   ( )M M∗
∗ = . In quantum theories the algebras A  and M
are in general noncommutative. In the special case of commutative algebras we speak of
classical quantum systems, and we can represent these algebras as in historical classical
mechanics by A C= ∞( )W  and M = ∞L ( )W , where  M∗ = L
1( )W .
Example: Individual and ontic states in quantum endophysics
The universe of discourse is characterized by a separable C*-algebra A  of
intrinsic observables. The selfadjoint elements of A  represent the potential
properties of the universe of discourse. The ontic state at time t is mathemati-
cally represented by a normalized extremal positive linear functional   rt  on A . Apotential property, represented by the selfadjoint element A∈A , is said to be
actualized at time t, if A is dispersionfree with respect to the ontic state rt  , that
is if   r rt tA A( ) { ( )}
2 2= . In this case we attribute the value   rt A( ) to theobservable A, and we say the observable A has the value   rt A( ) at time t. If anobservable is not dispersionfree, it is not actualized, and we attribute no value to
it. That is, the potential properties characterize the universe of dicourse, while
the actualized properties characterize the state of the universe of discourse1.
This ontic interpretation includes as a special case the traditional realistic interpretation of
classical point mechanics over the phase space W. In this case, the algebra of intrinsic
observables is given by the C*-algebra  A C= ∞( )W  of continuous functions on W which
vanish at infinity. The ontic states are represented by the points of W, or, by Gelfand’s
theorem, equivalently by the extremal positive elements of the dual of C ∞( )W . Since the
C*-algebra   C ∞( )W  is commutative, all observables are actualized at every instant.
1 In the traditional Hilbert-space formalism with a separable Hilbert space H , the algebra A  of intrinsic
observables is given by the separable C*-algebra A  = B H∞( )  of compact operators acting on H . There
is a one-to-one correspondence of ontic states and rays in H , so that every ontic state rt  can berepresented by a normalized state vector   Y( )t ∈H . An observable A is actualized if and only if the statevector   Y( )t  is eigenvector of A; in this case A has the value   Y Y( ) ( )t A t .
16
Example: Statistical and epistemic states in Hilbert-space quantum mechanics
The irreducible Hilbert-space representation of traditional quantum mechanics is
an exophysical statistical description and starts with a separable Hilbert space H .
The associated algebra   B H( ) of all bounded linear operators acting on H   plays
the role of the algebra M of bounded contextual observables,  M B H= ( ).
Traditional quantum mechanics uses the concept of statistical states which refer
to the outcome of statistical experiments. They enjoy the property of s-additivity
and are described by normalized positive elements of the predual  B H( )∗  of the
algebra   B H( ) of contextual observables,   { ( ) } ( )B H B H∗ ∗ = . The predual
  B H( )∗  is isomorphic to the Banach space  B H1( ) of all trace-class operators,
B H B H( ) ( )∗ ≅ 1 . Therefore, a statistical state r  of traditional quantum
mechanics can be represented by a positive trace-class operator   Dr  of unit trace,
r
r
r r r r
r
↔ ∈ ≥ =
= ∈
D D D D
A D A A
, ( ) , , tr( ) ,
( ) tr( ) for every ( ) .
B H
B H
1 0 1
The operator Dr  representing the statistical state r is called density operator.
Pure statistical states are represented by idempotent density operators.
The Heisenberg cut between object and environment
In all experimental science we have to split the world into two parts, the subject and the
object. There are many possibilities for such a cut. The Cartesian cut requires a separation
of the whole reality into mind and body. The Heisenberg cut 1 presupposes the Cartesian
cut, it divides in addition the purely material universe of discourse into a material object and
material observing tools. In choosing the Heisenberg cut we have some but not absolute
freedom since the cut must satisfy specific physical requirements. In the mathematical
framework of quantum mechanics, the Heisenberg cut requires a contextual tensor-product
decomposition of the whole material reality such that there are no Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen
correlations between the observed object and the observing tools. This cut is inevitably
contextual since in endophysics there is no God-given Heisenberg cut, not even an intrinsic
tensor-product structure.
Practical quantum mechanics presupposes that it is possible to dissect nature in such a way
that the observing tools can be described in terms of classical physics or engineering
science. The possibility of such a Heisenberg cut hinges crucially on an appropriate choice
of the tensor-product factorization of the universe of discourse. A sufficient condition is that
the relevant degrees of freedom of the measuring instrument constitute a classical quantum
system2.
1 Note that Heisenberg does not speak of a cut between observed system and observer but of a “Schnitt
zwischen dem zu beobachtenden System und den Messapparaten” [16], and of the “Schnitt zwischen der
Beschreibung durch Wellenfunktionen und der klassisch-anschaulichen Beschreibung” [15].
2 A quantum system is said to be classical if its algebra of observables is commutative. Note that every
classical quantum system depends on Planck's constant. If there are no Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen correla-
tions between the systems separated by the Heisenberg cut, then the existence of contextual classical
quantum systems has not to be postulated, but is a consequence of algebraic quantum mechanics. The suf-
ficient condition follows from the following theorem: Let A  and B  be two C*-algebras and C  = A  ⊗ B
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In endophysics, the space-time structure is introduced by the covariance of the theory under
a kinematic group (like the Poincaré or the Galilei group), while all interactions are due to
gauge fields [46]. This complex of ideas leads to a description of the endoworld in terms of
bare elementary entities and an artificial splitting of the Hamiltonian into a “free part”,
describing bare elementary systems and bare fields, and “interactions” between the free
parts. This endophysical tensorization leads to strong interactions and intense Einstein–
Podolsky–Rosen correlations between these bare elementary systems and is therefore
irrelevant for a tensorization appropriate for a Heisenberg cut. Starting with endophysical
first principles, we know virtually nothing about the existence, the uniqueness or
equivocality of exophysical tensor-product decompositions appropriate for an operational
description.
That is, endophysical first principles are insufficient for a theory of human knowledge.  A
theory which describes observable phenomena cannot keep the human means of data
processing out of consideration. Heisenberg’s cut is necessary for the description of the
patterns of the exophysical reality, it determines what we consider as relevant and what was
irrelevant. The need for contingent elements is the price we have to pay for the
operationalization of the endophysical first principles. In quantum endophysics, the notions
“patterns” and “phenomena” have no meaning. In order to get observable patterns, we have
to break the holistic symmetry of the endoworld by dividing it into an object system and an
observing system. The associated pattern recognition projects the holistic, non-Boolean
endoworld into an exophysical Boolean registration system. This projection is neither
arbitrary nor unique. It is not arbitrary since all possible patterns are preexistent in the
endoworld. But these preexistent patterns become manifest only in the appropriate exophys-
ical tensor product decomposition.
The relationship between the endophysical first principles and the directly observable
patterns is, however, notoriously difficult. In the mathematically formulated theory, it
amounts to find a dressing transformation which changes the endophysical tensorization in
terms of bare elementary systems to an exophysical tensorization such that the dressed
objects are not (or only weakly) Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen-correlated with the
environment1. By environment we simply mean everything which does not count to the
object system under investigation – the rest of the world. At first sight, the distinction
between object and environment is quite blurred when one considers the object and its
environment not as separate static entities but as dynamically interacting systems.
Fortunately, in the quantum-mechanical description there is an important criterium: In order
that the concepts «object» and «environment» make any sense at all, the corresponding
physical subsystems must not be entangled. The object may be in arbitrarily strong
interaction with its environment, but during the whole lifetime of the object there must be
no (or negligibly small) Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen correlations between object and
environment.
their minimal tensor product.  Every pure state g on C  is of the form g = a ⊗ b for some pure states a of
A  and b of B  if and only if either A  or B  is commutative ([40], theorem 4.14).
1 In general, we have to expect that the Heisenberg cut, hence the relevant exophysical tensorization is
time-dependent. Unfortunately, a theory of the dynamics of a Heisenberg cut seems to be beyond our
present proficiency.
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A short characterization of quantum endo- and exophysics
Endo-quantum-
mechanics
Exo-quantum-
mechanics
Basic mathematical structure
Continuous
(classical point mechanics:
manifolds)
Measureable
(classical statistical mechanics:
Lebesgue spaces)
Algebra of observables
Separable nuclear
C*-algebra A
(classical: commutative,
quantal: non-commutative)
W*-algebra M
with separable predual 
  
M*
(classical: commutative,
quantal: non-commutative)
Observables
Intrinsic observables:
 Selfadjoint operators A,
A∈A
 Contextual observables:
Probability operator measures F,
M M§ SF : →
States
Individual ontic states:
Extremal elements in the dual  A ∗
of the algebra A
 Statistical epistemic states:
Normalized positive elements of
the predual 
 
M* of M
Interpretation
Individual ontic interpretation:
An intrinsic observable  A∈A
represents potential properties.
An observable A is actualized if A
is dispersion-free with respect to
the ontic state  rt ,  r rt tA A( ) ( )
2 2= .
In this case, A has the value  rt A( ) .
Statistical epistemic interpretation:
A probability operator measure
  F : S→ M  and the statistical state
 r ∈M*  generate the probabilitymeasure   m S: → +®  for a
predictive measurement,
m r S( ) { ( )} ,B B B= ∈F .
Tensor product structure
Determined by an ergodic
representation of a fundamental
symmetry group, giving rise to
“bare” elementary systems.
Contextually reconstructed by the
requirement that exophysical
objects have to be disentangled.
Examples are “dressed particles”.
Referents of the theory
Elementary systems which have
an exhaustible set of attributes,
but which are entangled
with everything
Contextual objects which have
an inexhaustible set of attributes,
but which have to be disentangled
from the environment
Time Endo-time is represented bya one-parameter group
Exo-time is represented by
a one-parameter semigroup
Time operator No time operator for theNewtonian time does exist
A time operator for the
“Bergsonian” time may exist
(K-flow-type processes)
Dynamics
Deterministic
given by a time-reflection
invariant Hamiltonian
one-parameter group
Irreversible
given by a dynamical
one-parameter semigroup
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On the importance of the environment
The environment of an object system acts as background which is indefensibly neglected in
historical quantum mechanics. From our first principles we have absolutely no arguments
which would justify the neglect of the environment. The omnipresent Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen correlations imply that electrons, atoms, or molecules of the empirical reality never
exist in total isolation. That is, the environment of an exophysical quantum system can
never be left out of consideration. The environment induces symmetry breakings and is
responsible for the perceptible separability of the empirical reality and the localizability of
contextual objects.
Symmetry breakings are possible in quantum mechanics, though not in the historical
Hilbert-space codification of quantum mechanics by Johann von Neumann [21]. This
mathematical formalism stands and falls with the uniqueness theorem by Stone and von
Neumann for the canonical commutation relations [20, 39]. This theorem says that for
locally compact phase spaces all Hilbert-space representations of the canonical
commutation relations are physically equivalent, hence the Hilbert-space formalism is
justified. However, for systems with non-locally-compact phase spaces this uniqueness
theorem fails and there are infinitely many physically inequivalent and physically relevant
representations, so that in this situation the von Neumann codification becomes useless.
Nowadays, we know that inequivalent representations of the canonical commutation
relations are indispensable, not only for quantum field theory and quantum statistical
thermodynamics, but also for engineering physics, chemistry and biophysics. It is a simple
corollary of this uniqueness theorem that symmetry breakings and classical quantum
systems are impossible in the unnecessarily restricted von Neumann codification.
That is, the traditional Hilbert-space formalism is not an adequate codification, neither for
quantum endophysics nor for the description of the environment coming forth in quantum
exophysics. Fortunately, these difficulties fade away in the modern algebraic formulation of
quantum mechanics. Algebraic quantum mechanics is nothing else but a precise and
complete codification of the heuristic ideas of quantum mechanics of the pioneer days, it is
valid for systems with finitely or infinitely many degrees of freedom and is physically
equivalent to von Neumann’s codification in the case of purely quantal finite systems.
Algebraic quantum mechanics allows in a natural way the description of superselection
rules and of classical quantum systems.
An often heard, but fallacious objection against the relevance of algebraic quantum
mechanics is the claim that “the world is a system having only finitely many degrees of
freedom”. Evidently, this is not a physical but a metaphysical statement, an idea that dates
from the atomism of Democritos. The possibility to count degrees of freedom is the result of
a quite arbitrary normal-mode analysis. Exophysically speaking, a non-arbitrary criterion is
whether the phase space for the description of the environment is locally compact or not.
Since every material object system is coupled to the gravitational and to the electromagnetic
field these fields cannot be neglected in the description of the environment of a contextual
object. In a Hamiltonian description, these fields require phase spaces which are not locally
compact.
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From quantum endophysics to quantum exophysics
The connection between fundamental endophysical theories and exophysical descriptions is
nontrivial. It is related to the old enigma of the relationship between the simple, eternal,
unchanging, absolute universals of Plato’s reality and the rich complexity of particular
spatiotemporal material objects of our direct experience. As recent science has moved to
more and more abstractions, its basis has become more and more endo-theoretical, and the
connection with directly perceptible phenomena has become less and less evident. The
predicates of the endotheory cannot anymore be considered as approximately satisfied by
palpable exophysical objects. That is, the endophysical reality is quite distinct from the
exophysical reality, so that the explanatory and predictive power of endotheories needs to be
explained.
All concepts of empirical science refer to observations obtained by some pattern recognition
methods which abstract from many features, and concentrate on those aspects which we
consider as relevant. What is considered as relevant and what as irrelevant is never given
endophysically. Provided we are able to describe precisely what we consider as relevant and
what as irrelevant, what our deliberate lack of interest is, then we can add the very same
abstractions to the endophysical first principles. Such metatheoretical regulative principles
break fundamental symmetries of endophysics. However, there is no universal principle for
breaking endophysical symmetries, there are myriads of possibilities. The richness and
variety of the exophysical concrete and particular come into being by a contextual
symmetry breaking.
Symmetry breakings – which are inevitably necessary in order to divide the world in a part
“which sees” and a part “which is seen” – arise only if physically inequivalent exophysical
representations of the underlying endophysical structure exist. In the framework of algebraic
quantum mechanics, such a situation can arise only if the basic endophysical system is
sufficiently rich, that is, if the C*-algebra A  of the endophysical intrinsic observables is
essentially larger than the C*-algebra of compact operators (e.g. an anti-liminary
C*-algebra). A most interesting feature of algebraic quantum mechanics is that it provides
the mathematical tools which allow to step out of the endoworld, namely the Gelfand–
Naimark–Segal-construction, or GNS-construction for short. The GNS-construction allows
the construction of a context-dependent Hilbert-space H  and a faithful representation   p( )A
acting on the Hilbert space H . The weak closure of p( )A  in the Hilbert space H  is a
W*-algebra   M A⊃ p( )  which represents the algebra of contextual observables of an
exophysical description. From a conceptual point of view it is not surprising that such a
construction of quantum exophysics from quantum endophysics is highly nonunique. With
the only exception of von Neumann’s codification of traditional quantum mechanics (where
the endophysical C*-algebra is the algebra of compact operators), there are infinitely many
physically inequivalent W*-representations of the underlying endophysical C*-algebra of
intrinsic observables. These inequivalent W*-representations correspond to different
exophysical descriptions of one and the same endosystem.
Note that the exophysical W*-algebra M  is strictly larger than the faithful representation
p( )A  of the C*-algebra of endophysical observables. That is, all endophysical observables
appear also in exophysics but in addition there are new observables, also classical
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observables which commute with all observables, and spontaneously broken symmetries.
However, inequivalent representations lead to different new observables and to different
symmetries. We call such contextual new observables emergent1 in the sense that they are
generated by the endophysical algebra A  of intrinsic observables together with a context
which selects a particular representation. Clearly, emergent exophysical observables are not
functions of the elements of p(A ).
Since there are uncountably infinitely many inequivalent representations of the endo-
physical C*-algebra, the selection of the relevant ones is not an easy task. Every repre-
sentation, hence every exophysical description, is related to a particular abstraction and
idealization. An exophysical description is possible only by a deliberate lack of interest, a
decision of what we consider as relevant and what as irrelevant. Such a choice is not written
down in the endophysical first principles of the basic theory. However, we can in addition to
the intrinsic norm topology of the endophysical C*-algebra introduce a new contextual
topology which describes our ideas of what is relevant and what is not.
In the framework of the GNS-construction, such a contextually selected topology can be
introduced via a particular positive linear functional r on a C*-algebra A  of intrinsic
observables. The pair   ( , )r A  gives rise to a (within unitary equivalence) unique cyclic
representation ( , , )p Xr r rH , called the GNS-representation of A  induced by r. The
corresponding exophysical W*-algebra   Mr of contextual observables (with respect to thetopology induced by r) is then given by the weak closure of   pr( )A  in the algebra   B H( )rof all bounded linear operators acting on Hr .
Our ability to describe the world cannot go farther than our ability to isolate exophysical
objects which have individuality and properties. They may change their actualized
properties but they keep their identity. We adopt the view that exophysical objects are
carriers of patterns, they arise in interaction with the rest of the world, and are always
contextual and inherently fuzzy. Nevertheless, they reflect structures of the world. Nature’s
pattern emerge and become intelligible only with the active participation of the human
mind. Contextual objects are constructed, not «things in themselves», they are phenomenal
entities posited by the theory.
In quantum exophysics, we define an object as an open quantum system, interacting with its
environment, but which is not Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen-correlated with the environment.
Quantum systems which are not objects are entangled with their environments, they have no
individuality and allow only an incomplete description in terms of statistical states. From
the mathematical formalism of algebraic quantum mechanics it follows that the observing
system necessarily must be a classical quantum system (in the sense of Boolean logical
structure). In retrospect, this situation justifies Bohr’s requirement that “the functioning of
the measuring instrument must be described within the framework of classical physical
ideas” [3]. This requirement is also in agreement with the fact that, without exception, every
experimental arrangement of present-day physical science, and all experimental results in
physics, chemistry and molecular biology can be described in engineering terms, using only
concepts from classical physics and the engineering sciences.
1 A typical emergent contextual classical observable is temperature, it is manifest in all global represen-
tations which are relevant for the description of systems in thermal equilibrium.
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Exodynamics from endodynamics
Since maximal symmetry is a typical characteristric of an endophysical first principle, we
consider the arrow of time as an exophysical manifestation of a broken time-inversion
symmetry, and posit for endophysics a time evolution characterized by a one-parameter
group, distinguished by time-inversion symmetry. As a result, in an endophysical codifi-
cation of quantum mechanics the dynamics is supposed to be time-reflection invariant and
bidirectionally deterministic. The concept of probability does not appear in quantum
endophysics. That is, quantum endophysics is intrinsically a deterministic nonprobabilistic
theory.
On the other hand, quantum exophysics is, by its very nature, a statistical theory which
presupposes the existence of statistical Boolean classification devices, hence of external
classical measuring systems, which have a nonanticipating Boolean memory, and which
show an irreversible dissipative behavior.
Where are the primary probabilities [24] of quantum exophysics coming from? First of all,
the endophysical determinism does not imply that the dynamics is fully determinable or
predictable by an observer. Any operationalization of the endophysical first principles
requires a cut between the observed object and the observing tools. The probabilities of
quantum-exophysics enter the picture at the cut between the quantum object and the
classical exosystem. Note that primary probabilities are conditional probabilities. The
condition is the particular choice of a Heisenberg cut. Although these probabilities are
contextual – they depend on our choice of the cut – , they are nevertheless irreducible since
the Heisenberg cut cannot be avoided in an operational description. That is, in quantum
exophysics, probability is a primary notion, and not – as in classical exophysics – merely a
specification of our ignorance. The correctness condition for the statistical interpretation of
exophysics is given by the long-run frequencies for theoretical probability statements.
If we describe quantum endophysics by a C*-algebra, and quantum exophysics by a
W*-algebra which is induced by a contextually selected topology, we can transfer via the
GNS-construction the fundamental endophysical dynamics to the contextual exophysical
description. As a rule, such a transition brings about contextual symmetry breakings so that
the dynamics of an exophysical description of the endophysical reality can look very
different from the basic intrinsic dynamics. For example, there are exactly soluble
C*-models with an automorphic (hence time-reflection invariant and bidirectionally
deterministic) endophysical dynamics which generate exophysical dynamical semigroups,
or even exophysical W*-descriptions with truly irreversible K-flow-type time evolutions.
This is not to say that there are no problems in deriving exophysical descriptions from
endophysics – but breaking endophysical symmetries is not a mystery (albeit demanding
high mathematical skill).
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First problem: Symmetry breaking is not enough
For one thing, every symmetry breaking demands a selection on the part of the
observer. For example, if in an exophysical realization the time-inversion
symmetry of the dynamics is broken, there exists of necessity a similar but
physically different realization with a time arrow in the opposite direction.
Additional exophysical regulative principles (e.g. that of Baconian science) are
necessary to select an appropriate realization1.
Second problem: The endophysical time evolution is not a C*-automorphism
A further, much more serious problem is the fact that as a rule the endophysical
dynamics is not given by a one-parameter group of C*-automorphisms2. This is
not a deathblow for the construction of  exophysical dynamical W*-systems but
it complicates the mathematical discussion severely since in this case the
endophysical C*-dynamics is only well-defined for a dense set of states or
observables. On the other hand, this situation is compulsory for the derivation of
exophysical nonlinear dynamical semigroups as they are required for the
description of classical exosystems. Another, almost paradigmatic example for
the mathematical difficulties one encounters in dynamical endo/exo-interface
problems is the notorious “measurement problem of quantum mechanics”.
Unfortunately, most discussions of the measurement process are conceptually
and mathematically inadequate, usually based on grossly oversimplified models.
It is a simple mathematical fact3 that an endophysical automorphic time evolu-
tion cannot solve the measurement problem of exophysics.
Endodynamics from exodynamics
Given a hypothetical C*-algebraic quantum endophysics, then the GNS-construction allows
us to introduce a contextually selected new topology and to derive an exophysical
W*-algebraic description appropriate to the chosen context. The inverse problem of decon-
textualization, that is, of guessing the universal endophysics from a few exophysical
descriptions, is ill-posed. It is therefore quite a miracle how we ever could get reasonable
candidates for endophysical laws – certainly they cannot be conceived simply from sense
data and empirical regularities without recourse to primordial ideas.
Nonetheless, there are a number of mathematical dilation theorems which possibly may
relate Bergsonian time to Newtonian time. The first step is an exophysical system-
theoretical realization of the given phenomenological exophysical description in terms of a
new state concept which summarizes the history of the system. This is achieved by a
1 For a more detailed discussion of this problem, compare [31].
2 This statement may irritate mathematicians. Yet, the pre-established harmony between physics and math-
ematics does not go so far as one could hope for. While the free dynamics for group-theoretically defined
elementary systems are usually automorphisms, there is no reason to expect that the introduction of inter-
actions between bare elementary systems leads to automorphic time-evolutions. For an illuminating sim-
ple example, compare [8].
3 Compare e.g. [19].
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transformation of the given mathematically formulated phenomenological evolution law
into a state-space description in terms of first-order differential equations. A system-
theoretical state at time t specifies the equivalence class of all histories (for t< 0) of the
system which give rise to the same predictions for all conceivable future experiments on the
system. Mathematical system theory gives a complete answer to the question of existence,
classification and equivalence of state-space realizations. A system-theoretical realization of
an exophysical description corresponds to a well-posed Cauchy problem, or equivalently, to
a formulation of the given phenomenological law in terms of a dynamical semigroup.
Typically, such dynamical semigroups describe irreversible phenomena, and have no
inverse elements.
The next, and crucial step in the decontextualization is the passing to a  dynamics having a
higher symmetry. Since all known candidates for an endophysical dynamical law have a
Hamiltonian structure, we may pose a Hamiltonian realization problem: can a given
dynamical semigroup be dilated to a Hamiltonian dynamics? There are many results in this
direction. For example, every reasonable linear semigroup has a Hamiltonian realization in
terms of a strongly continuous one-parameter group of unitary operators acting on some
Hilbert space. Such a realization can be considered as a unitary dilation of the system-
theoretical description in terms of an irreversible one-parameter semigroup to a reversible
one-parameter group acting in a larger Hilbert space. If such a dilation can be accomplished,
Stone’s theorem allows to define a selfadjoint generator which in turn gives rise to a
Hamiltonian realization in the enlarged Hilbert space. The corresponding unitary operators
generate a multiplier C*-algebra containing the endophysical C*-algebra A . A generaliza-
tion of Stone’s theorem for C*-algebras [17] allows then a reconstruction of a
corresponding Hamiltonian dynamics on the endophysical level.
A Hamiltonian realization of a genuine damping is always possible but it requires a
mechanical model with infinitely many degrees of freedom, even if the original (say
Newtonian) description is very simple. The following example is well known.
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Example: Hamiltonian dilation of the simplest semigroup
The exponential   t e ta − !t ,   t ≥ < < ∞0 0, t  , is a strictly contractive semigroup
of operators in a one-dimensional space. Extending its definition to the negative
axis, we obtain the following continuous real-valued function of positive type,
  
t e e dt ita − −=
+
−∞
∞
∫! !!t lp
t
lt
l1 1 2( )    .
Let   " # $e t
it H− ∈®  be a strongly continuous one-parameter group of unitary
operators e it H− , and let   { ( )}E l  be the spectral family of the selfadjoint generator
H,
e e dEit H it− −=
−∞
∞
∫ l l( )   .
Let furthermore P be a nontrivial projection with one-dimensional range PH . If
the measure   PE P( )l  admits the Radon-Nykodym derivative   ( ) { ( ) }t p lt! ! 1 2+ ,
we can represent the motion t e ta − ! !!t  by the contracted motion t P e Pit Ha − ,
e e d PE Pt it− −=
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Since the support of the Cauchy distribution   l t p lta ( ) { ( ) }! ! 1 2+  is the entire
line   ®, it follows that the spectrum of H is   ®, simple and absolutely continuous.
The dilation of the semigroup t e ta − !t  can be realized in the Hilbert space
L2( )®  of Lebesgue square integrable functions by
  { }( ) ( )e eit H it− −=F l F ll    ,     F ∈L2( )®    ,
and the one-dimensional subspace PH  spanned by any normalized square-
integrable functions f satisfying
  
! !f l t p
lt
( ) ( )
2
21= +
!     ,
so that
e e dt it H− ∗ −=
−∞
∞
∫!t f l f l l( ) ( )    .
Such mathematical dilation theorems are immensely helpful for guessing endophysical
laws, but – of course – they cannot give a recipy to construct endophysics from exophysics.
Both, system-theoretical and Hamiltonian dilations are ontologically neutral. A Hamiltonian
realization does not claim that it is materially implemented, say by “atoms” or by “infinitely
many mechanical degrees of freedom”.
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